swarmalpha / LAB
Virtual market · research mode
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Market Efficiency Lab · 01

When expectations become prices.

A market price can condense knowledge. It can also reflect uncertainty, low liquidity, or collective herding behavior. This lab makes the difference visible.

Simulation · Project Aurora

Will Project Aurora pass the independent acceptance test by September 30?

Markt 59
Community Poll54%
Forecasting Model60%
Market Price59
OutcomeOpen
01 · Private Information

The dots show different private assessments. Their spread is information – not just disorder.

Knowledge Layer · 02

When does the swarm become a herd?

Collective judgments can be powerful when information is distributed and assessments are sufficiently independent. If everyone merely follows the same visible forecast, no information is multiplied.
01

Diversity

Different sources create the raw material for collective insight.

02

Independence

A visible price informs – and influences the next decision.

03

Liquidity

A price without market depth can shift significantly even with small orders.

04

Correction

Counter-positions and arbitrage can make inconsistencies visible.

Evidence Cases · 03

What the sources actually show.

Academic · 2026

Replication Markets

Prognosis markets had informational value, but did not replace actual replication.

28 replications
Market and survey each correctly classified 18 cases. Small sample size and exploratory evaluation limit the statement.
Research · Market integrity

Polymarket Arbitrage

Logically connected markets can simultaneously show inconsistent prices.

Rebalancing and combinatorial arbitrage
The reported profit estimate depends on detection logic, filters, and execution assumptions.
Historical evidence · 2007

Redmonitor RealPrice

Tradable forecasts were supposed to simultaneously generate a continuous market consensus.

Exchange plus Information Layer
Special forecast quality remained an operator hypothesis; T&Cs, operator texts, and Heise are listed separately.
Market Structure · 04

Who trades with whom?

Technical market organization, legal counterparty, and economic risk are not the same thing.

Model Counterparty Price formation Structural question
Peer to Peer Participants Order book and matching Initial liquidity
Market Maker Liquidity provider Quotes Conflicts of interest
AMM Rule-based pool Price function Parameters and depth
House Operator Set conditions Counterparty conflict